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INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THIS REPORT
In the past eight years there has been an increasing interest in Bud­
dhist hermeneutics among scholars in North America. Although not 
the first article addressing the topic,* 1 Robert F. Thurman’s “Buddhist 
Hermeneutics,” published in 1978,2 was the incentive for other articles 
such as “Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics: The Case of Hua-yen” by 
Peter Gregory,3 and “Prasanga and Deconstruction: Tibetan Buddhist 
Hermeneutics and the Yana Controversy” by Nathan Katz.4 In addi­
tion, several academic conferences have held panel discussions devoted 
to cross-cultural hermeneutics in the study of religion. A University of 
Hawaii conference, in July 1985, on “Changing Facets of Buddhism,” 
included a section on hermeneutics. The most substantial conference 
on Buddhist hermeneutics to date took place in June 1984 in Los 
Angeles; it was co-sponsored by the Kuroda Institute for the Study of 
Buddhism and Human Values and the National Endowment for the 
Humanities. Among the many presentations were those by George 
* An earlier version of this review was read on July 4, 1985 to Otani University’s 
Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute and published in its Annual Memoirs 
3 (1985). Research for part of this report was funded by a generous grant from the 
Japan Foundation.
1 As early as 1949 Etienne Lamotte published an article on the critique of interpreta­
tion in Buddhism: “La critique d’interpretation dans le bouddhisme,” Bruxelles 
University Libre, Institut de Philosophic et d’Histoire Orientates et Slaves, Annuaire 9, 
pp. 341-361.
2 In the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 46, 1, pp. 19-39.
3 Also in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 51, 2 (1983), pp. 231- 
249.
4 In Philosophy East and West, 34, no. 4 (1984), pp. 185-203.
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Bond, Kajiyama Yuichi, and Donald Lopez on Indian Buddhist 
hermeneutics; Robert Thurman, Jeffrey Hopkins, Michael Broido and 
Mathew Kapstein on hermeneutics in Tibetan texts; Peter Gregory and 
Robert Gimello on Hua-yen hermeneutics; Robert Buswell on Korean 
Ch’an hermeneutics, Thomas Kasulis on Kftkai’s hermeneutics, and 
Roger Corless on Shinran’s hermeneutics. Luis Gdmez spoke on the 
possibility of a Buddhist hermeneutic, and I raised some questions per­
taining to readings of DOgen’s ShObdgenzd. Alan Sponberg, Carl 
Bielefeldt, David Chappell and theologian David Tracy responded to 
the papers in general. They are being edited by Donald Lopez for 
publication as a book.5
5 Buddhist Hermeneutics, forthcoming in the Kuroda Institute Studies in East Asian 
Buddhism series, published by the University of Hawaii Press.
The discussion so far has raised important questions for understan­
ding the Buddhist tradition. Some of these questions have been dealt 
with explicitly; others remain to be investigated. In the following, I will 
characterize recent findings concerning Buddhist hermeneutics and will 
contrast them with the meaning of hermeneutics in the Western tradi­
tion that provided the initial paradigm. This contrast will point out two 
essential problems that need much more attention in future work: what 
is our own hermeneutical situation vis-i-vis the tradition we would 
interpret, and what is the meaning of history for Buddhism? These 
questions in turn provide a context for reviewing some recent works on 
Buddhist historicity and historical consciousness and for raising a final 
question: How might a deeper awareness of Buddhist notions of 
history change modern methods of studying Buddhism?
Needless to say, this brief review cannot do full justice to the works 
mentioned, much less to the vast domains of historicity and 
hermeneutics in Buddhism. But its purpose will be met if it gives the 
reader a sense of current scholarship in these fields and suggests mean­
ingful topics for further research.
The Possibility of Buddhist Hermeneutics
The sense of hermeneutics in recent investigations. Hermeneutics is an 
ambiguous word with a wide range of meanings. Thurman's article 
defined it quite broadly as the “philosophical discipline of rational in­
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terpretation of a traditional canon of Sacred Scripture” or the *‘science 
of interpretation of sacred doctrine.”6 Katz specified this no further 
when he defined hermeneutics as the ‘‘systematic interpretation of texts 
considered sacred by a given tradition.”7 For the most part, the recent 
investigations have focused on identifying the principles and techni­
ques of interpretation utilized in ancient Buddhist writings. Often the 
principles underlying interpretive choices are only remotely implied in 
the scriptures or commentaries, and these must be surmised and ar­
ticulated by the scholar today. Moreover, the implicit basis of inter­
pretation may shift from a focus on content to a focus on context, or 
from the work itself to the reader who puts the work into practice. 
Thus we may distinguish between content-based and context-based 
hermeneutics, as Thurman suggests, and between text-based and 
adept-based hermeneutics, as Katz proposes.8 The latter distinction in 
particular is germane to the discussion, which I will return to later, of 
what Buddhism has to offer to the field of hermeneutics in general.
6 Thurman, pp. 19, 20.
7 Katz, p. 188.
1 Thurman, p. 26; Katz, pp. 185-186.
9 Thurman, p. 32.
More explicit are the techniques and strategies invented to arrange as 
well as interpret the scriptures or passages in them. Most often men­
tioned is the early hermeneutical device (in Ahguttara nikOya 1.60 and 
other texts) of dividing texts into two groups: those of definitive mean­
ing (nitartha) and those in need of interpretation (neyOrtha). This 
strategy receives more sophisticated differentiation in the PrSsaiigika- 
Madhyamika tradition where, as Thurman has pointed out, nTtQrtha 
comes to indicate a text or passage of ultimate subject matter, whether 
or not it can be read literally, and neydrtha indicates something of con­
ventional or interpretable subject matter.9
Other examples of highly nuanced if philosophically ungrounded 
hermeneutical schemes are the systems of doctrinal classification such 
as Indian siddhQnta and Chinesep’an chiao A great deal has been 
written about the latter, whose hermeneutical implications have been 
most clearly worked out by Peter Gregory. Gregory understands p'an 
chiao as a Chinese response to a twofold hermeneutical problem: how 
to explain Buddhism to an originally non-Buddhist Chinese mentality, 
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and, more specifically, how to explain the wide array of often conflic­
ting Buddhist teachings transmitted to China. Thusp’an chiao was “a 
hermeneutical strategy ... to find a set of principles to provide a 
framework in which the vast and sometimes contradictory array of 
holy literature . . . could be understood in a systematic fashion.”10
10 See Gregory’s unpublished dissertation, “Tsung-mi’s Inquiry Into the Origin of 
Mam \ Study of Chinese Buddhist Hermeneutics’* (Harvard University, 1981), p. 2.
The doctrine of upOya in the Lotus Sutra is, as might be expected, 
another favorite example of a hermeneutical strategy. According to 
Gregory, it implied that the Buddha’s teachings had to be understood 
in the context in which they were delivered, and it distinguished be­
tween provisional Hinayana teachings addressed to those of inferior 
understanding, and the ultimate Mahayana teaching. Hence, the doc­
trine of upOya shows an awareness of the Buddha’s (the speaker’s) in­
tention and of the listener’s/reader’s capacity to understand. The 
Mahayana idea of matching the intent of a scripture or passage to the 
listener’s capacity was not of course without Theravada precedent; the 
gradual path to nibbana has been pointed out as a strategy to relate the 
one inclusive dhamma to monks and lay persons of different levels.
Other examples of hermeneutical schemes and strategies have been 
analyzed in recent literature, but I hope that the above examples will 
suffice to document the interests and directions of current scholarship. 
There is a sense of excitement regarding the deep appreciation of 
hermeneutical problems in traditional Buddhist texts, but at the same 
time a sense that the search for Buddhist hermeneutics has just begun. 
In order for this search to progress and for the task of constructing a 
Buddhist hermeneutic really to begin, 1 feel that two essential features 
of the Western hermeneutical tradition must be realized. It is not a mat­
ter of importing a Western technology to come to the aid of an 
underdeveloped tradition; ever since the use of Western historico- 
critical methods it is of course already much too late to speak of a Bud- 
dhology uninfluenced by Western methodology. Besides, as we shall 
see, Western hermeneutics does not reduce to a concern with technical 
method, any more than Buddhist history reduces to a concern with 
historical fact. It is, however, a matter of appreciating and incor­
porating two interests within the current Western hermeneutical tradi­
tion that provided the impetus for the search for Buddhist 
20
HERMENEUTICS AND HISTORICITY
hermeneutics. Let me briefly review the development of hermeneutics 
in the West, in order to expose some shortcomings in the search con­
ducted so far.
The Western hermeneutical tradition. The term “hermeneutics” was 
not used until the seventeenth century, when it came to signify the prin­
ciples and methods of interpreting the Holy Scriptures (the Bible) in 
distinction from interpretation itself, or exegesis. But long before that, 
theologians had reflected on problems of interpretation, particularly in 
order to do justice to the Old Testament and to different levels of mean­
ing from a Christian point of view. In the second century, Origen 
developed a scheme of three senses or levels of meaning in the sacred 
scriptures: literal, moral, and allegorical-mystical; the last level cor­
responded best to the intention of divine inspiration. Over the cen­
turies many other hermeneutical schemes were formulated.
Not until F. D. E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) did hermeneutics as 
an independent discipline begin. For Schleiermacher, hermeneutics 
could no longer be taken merely as an aid to understanding difficult 
passages or foreign languages, because the very act of understanding 
itself could no longer be taken for granted. Humans employ her­
meneutics whenever they attempt to understand a written work, be it 
sacred or profane, and even whenever they communicate in daily life; 
but hermeneutics as a methodical and principled discipline had yet to 
be developed, according to Schleiermacher. Hermeneutics was “the art 
of understanding” achieved through analysis of language and empathy 
with an author; the interpreter needed to stand in an immediate rela­
tion with the matter to be understood." Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)
11 Schleiermacher’s scattered writings on hermeneutics have been edited by H. Kim- 
merle and published as Hermeneutik, nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben und 
eingelietet (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959, 2nd ed. 1974). The latter edition has been 
translated by James Duke and Jack Forstman as Hermeneutics: The Handwritten 
Manuscripts by F. D. E. Schleiermacher (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977). For 
critical discussions of philosophical hermeneutics in the Western tradition since 
Schleiermacher, see John C. Maraldo, Der hermeneutische Zirkel: Untersuchungen zu 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey und Heidegger (Freiburg/Munchen: Karl Alber, 1974, 
reprinted 1984); and Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in 
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Evanston: Northwestern Univer­
sity Press, 1969). The Hermeneutics Reader, ed. Kurt Mueller-Vollmer (New York: 
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then advanced Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics as the foundation of all 
the Geisteswissenschajten, which were built upon the possibility of em­
pathetic understanding rather than objective explanation. Towards the 
end of his career, Dilthey came to see the act of understanding as a fun­
damental characteristic of human existence itself.* 12
Continuum, 1985) contains important excerpts from the works of Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and others.
12 Dilthey’s expositions on hermeneutics are found throughout his collected works, 
especially in volume I: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, ed. B. Groethuysen, 
1966; volume V: Die geistige Welt, which includes the essay, “Die Entstehung der 
Hermeneutik," ed. G. Misch, 1961; and volume VII: Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen 
Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, ed. B. Groethuysen, 1965, all published by 
Vandenhock & Ruprecht, Stuttgart-Gottingen. Volume IV of Dilthey’s Selected Works 
in English translation, ed. Rudolf Makkreel & Frithjof Rodi (Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming) will be entitled Hermeneutics and the Rise of Historical Consciousness.
*’ Heidegger developed his ontological hermeneutics principally in Sein und Zeit 
(Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1927), translated into English by John Macquarrie and Edward 
Robinson as Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962). Technically, Heideg­
ger writes not of Vorverstiindnis but of a threefold structure that conditions all 
understanding: Vorhabe (pre-having), Vorsicht (foresight), and Vorgrijf (pre-grasp).
14 Wahrheit und Methode: Grundziige einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Tub­
ingen: J. C. B. Mohr, I960, 3rd ed. 1972); English translation by Garret Barden and 
William G. Doerpel (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) then pursued the notion of understan­
ding as a dimension of human existence, and proceeded to ontologize 
hermeneutics. Understanding is not something humans occasionally 
engage in; rather it is the very act of their being, it is a way in which 
they are, a Seinsweise; hence hermeneutics, as reflection upon under­
standing, became the analysis of human existence for Heidegger. One 
essential feature revealed by this analysis was the Vorverstandnis, the 
pre-understanding, that is always operative in anticipation of our grasp 
of things in the world. Another was the radical historicity of our 
understanding, or the fact that our understanding is always historically 
conditioned and situated.13 14
In the 1960’s Hans-Georg Gadamer developed Heidegger’s on­
tological hermeneutics in his book Truth and Method.'4 Gadamer em­
phasized three points important for our deliberations here. First, in the 
course of understanding a text, we must become aware of the pre­
judgments (Vorurteile) that we bring with us, and we must evaluate 
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them and notice how they are gradually transformed. Secondly, we 
must appreciate the historical distance between us and a text or author 
of the past. Hence, understanding is a process of fusing our own 
horizon with that presupposed by the text; it is a Horizont- 
verschmelzung. As such, hermeneutics is active appropriation, and not 
application of a set of rules or canons. Gadamer also developed the no­
tion of Wirkungsgeschichte, or history shaped by the effects of well-en­
trenched interpretations of the sources of a tradition. According to 
Gadamer, we must fully recognize the impact of the history operative 
between our times and those of an ancient author or text. Any attempt 
to evade this effective history and to stand in immediate relation with 
the past is an uncritical pretence. Finally, of utmost importance for 
the topic of Buddhist hermeneutics is Gadamer’s notion of 
wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewufttsein, our awareness of the herme­
neutical situation in which we stand as modern readers and critics vis- 
&-vis the effective history of texts we seek to understand.
Of course, hermeneutics has also been developed in other directions 
since Heidegger. Emilio Betti has pursued a rule-governed, objective 
hermeneutics as the methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften.'5 Paul 
Ricoeur has formulated a “hermeneutics of suspicion” critical of 
systematic distortions at work on the cultural as well as personal level, 
and of our naivete in accepting the self-understanding of an author, 
text or tradition.15 6 The “poststructuralists” Jacques Derrida and 
Michel Foucault have articulated a kind of anti-hermeneutics that ques­
tions the notions of authorship, originality, influence and determinate 
meaning.17 In all Western developments of the term, hermeneutics is a 
15 See Betti’s Teoria generale delta interprelazione (Milan: Dott A. Giuffre, 1955); 
translated into German as Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der 
Geis teswissenschaften (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1967); see also Die Hermeneutik als 
allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Tfibingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1962).
16 See especially Ricoeur’s De /'interpretation: essai sur Freud (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1965); translated into English by Denis Savage as Freud and Philosophy: An 
Essay in Interpretation (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1970). See also 
Le conflit des interpretations (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969); English translation as 
The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press. 1974).
” For Derrida’s “deconstructionist” hermeneutics, see particularly De la gram­
ma tologie (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967); translated into English by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak as Of Grammatology (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
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highly reflective and self-conscious discipline that focuses on methods 
and principles of interpretation as opposed to interpretation or exe­
gesis itself. In the modern sense of the term, an interpretive scheme or 
strategy is not “hermeneutical” unless it reflects an awareness of the 
problems of method, historical distance, and the historical position of 
the interpreter. Further, in modern hermeneutical theory, language is 
essential to being human; there is no pre-linguistic or extra-linguistic ex­
perience (although there may be pre-conceptual experience). In the 
words of Gadamer, wherever being is understood, we are dealing with 
language (“Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache**)^9 in the 
words of Derrida, there is no measure outside language, “there is 
nothing outside of the text” (// rt’y a pas de hors-texte).'9
University Press, 1976). See also L'ecriture et la difference (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
1967); English translation by Alan Bass: Writing and Difference (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1978). David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1978) is a critical discussion of Derrida and 
other recent developments in philosophical hermeneutics. Foucault’s views are 
developed in, among other works, D. F. Bouchard, ed., Michel Foucault: Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and interviews (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1977). For a critical discussion of his entire corpus, see Hubert L. 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).
18 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. job; Truth and Method, p. xxiii.
19 Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 158.
The task of a search for Buddhist hermeneutics. Now let us return to 
the question of Buddhist hermeneutics, for example, the Buddhist inter­
pretive scheme of designating a given text as nTtOrtha or neyOrtha, or 
placing it within a p’an chiao system, or developing such a doctrinal 
classification. From the perspective of modern Western hermeneutics, 
these schemes would be “hermeneutical” only in a very qualified sense. 
They would need at least to show some degree of reflection upon 
methods of interpreting or classifying scriptures. To qualify for the 
designation “hermeneutical” in a more restricted sense, they would 
need to be cognizant of understanding as a mode of being, and of 
language as essential to experience. Even Thurman’s initial definition 
of hermeneutics as “a philosophical discipline of rational interpreta­
tion of a traditional canon of Sacred Scriptures authoritative for a *
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religious community” seems closer to a definition of scriptural exegesis 
than of hermeneutics.
Examples of the distinction between exegesis and hermeneutics are 
easier to find in the Western theological tradition than in Asian Bud­
dhist traditions. Karl Barth’s 1918 exegesis, Der Romerbrief (Epistle to 
the Romans), as methodical and historically aware as it is, is clearly 
different in character from his hermeneutical remarks, in the prefaces 
to its various editions, that place a limit to historico-critical 
methodology, or from his later reflections in Kirchliche Dogmatik 
(Christian Dogmatics) upon the problem of which principles of inter­
preting the Bible are valid (proclaiming as such only those that derive 
from one’s witness to revelation). Similarly, Rudolf Bultmann’s 
general reflections on the set of initial questions (the pre-understand­
ing) that guides any interpretation are quite distinct from his exposi­
tions of specific passages of the New Testament, and even from his 
classification of passages according to historical genres (his application 
of Formgeschichte, or form criticism). In the Buddhist tradition one 
finds ample instances of exegesis in the numerous textual commen­
taries; but any explication of the principles that the commentator ac­
tually used in dealing with a text in detail is, almost without exception, 
a task left to the scholar today. Other Buddhist texts are explicit and 
generalizing enough about how to understand or how to place previous 
teachings, but are notably lacking in justification of their interpretive 
principles. For example, the Lotus Sutra’s doctrine of uptiya is clearly 
a means to make sense of discordant teachings or “vehicles,” and 
Chih-i’s intricate classification system articulates a rationale for arrang­
ing scriptures in a hierarchy culminating in the Lotus Sutra; but neither 
the Lotus Sutra nor Chih-i attempts in general to justify the principle 
of upOya.20
20 In an unpublished book-length manuscript, “Rational Justification and Buddhist 
Hermeneutics,” Douglas Daye of Bowling Green State University is skeptical of the 
upOya theory as an adequate strategy to reconcile conflicting doctrines. On the other 
hand, William LaFleur ascribes a high level of reflection to the Lotus Sutra, sees its 
presentation of upOya as “self-reflexive allegory,” and says that “the parables of the 
Lotus are about the role and status of parabolic speech itself” (The Karma of Words: 
Buddhism and the Literary Arts in Medieval Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1983, p. 87).
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In short, it is an exegetical exercise to give a systematic interpretation 
of a text or to arrange texts systematically; it would be a hermeneutical 
exercise to determine the methods and bounds of interpretation, to con­
sider the validity of textual classifications, or to construct a general 
theory of interpretation. Scholars have noted the dearth of reflection 
on method in interpretive texts of the Buddhist tradition, and the 
almost complete absence of general theories of understanding.21 A 
clear-cut distinction between exegesis and hermeneutics may, however, 
turn out to be inappropriate in the search for Buddhist hermenetics, 
particularly if hermeneutics is construed as the theory, and exegesis as 
the practice of interpretation. The major Western theorist, Hans- 
Georg Gadamer, has himself emphasized application as a genuinely 
hermeneutical task that calls for relating the meaning of a text to the 
present and requires a critical appreciation of historical distance.22 
Panl Ricoeur also has stressed appropriation of a text’s meaning or 
power to disclose to the present reader.2’
21 One exception, at least in the interpretation of Mathew Kapstein, is the work of 
the Tibetan scholar Mi-pham (1846-1912) that reflects on the foundations of inter­
pretive systems, rather than giving rules of thumb to make doctrines consistent. See 
Kapstein’s contribution to the forthcoming book, Buddhist Hermeneutics.
22 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 290ff.; Truth and Method, pp. 274ff. It ap­
pears, however, that the Buddhist sense of application would collapse the historical 
distance so esteemed by Gadamer.
23 See Ricoeur’s interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort 
Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), pp. 92ff.
24 See especially the contributions by David Tracy, Alan Sponberg, and David Chap-
The respondents at the previously mentioned Kuroda Institute con­
ference suggested that the major contribution of Buddhism to the 
general field of hermeneutics may be its sophisticated if latent theories 
of application and reference to the present student of the texts.24 Ap­
plication in Buddhist theories is radically situational, disclosive, and 
soteriological. That is, texts are often read as addressing not only a pre­
sent reader, but a reader in a particular situation or stage of spiritual 
development; they disclose the meaning of one’s experience of the 
world more than they serve as authoritarian sources of doctrine; and 
they fulfill a salvific or liberative function by divesting one of illusions 
or false views (drsti). This sort of dis-illusionment and identification of 
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systemic distortions in one’s view of reality may be seen as a radicaliza­
tion of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion. Ricoeur has also written 
of the world as the ultimate reference of a text;25 Buddhist 
hermeneutics often more radically undercuts any distinction between in­
terpreting texts and interpreting reality, as the conference respondents 
pointed out. This radicalization may seem to lie in the direction of Der­
rida’s collapse (or endless deferral) of a determinate difference between 
language and a reality outside language that words refer to.26 But 
whereas Derrida consequently remains bound to language, remains 
“logocentric” himself in spite of his suspicion of the spoken word, it 
was suggested that in Buddhism there never was a logos tradition; from 
the beginning the word has been as suspect as are egocentric modes of 
perceiving the world. Moreover, a reconstruction of the latent Bud­
dhist hermeneutics would show it, unlike its Western counterparts, to 
be radically transformational; it serves the purpose not primarily of 
understanding a text or the world but of transforming the interpreter, 
and along with him, the world. It has even been suggested that Bud­
dhist meditation practices are hermeneutical exercises or systematic 
methodologies “for uncovering and transforming the basis of our 
understanding of the world.”27
pell in the forthcoming Buddhist Hermeneutics.
25 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, pp. 36-37, 92.
26 One recent work takes up Buddhism, especially NftgArjuna, as a way to resolve 
some Derridian difficulties: Robert Magliola, Derrida on the Mend (Lafayette, IN: Pur­
due University Press, 1984).
27 Peter Gregory, “Reflections on the Chinese Buddhist Meditation Tradition,” in 
Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism, Studies in East Asian Buddhism, vol. 
4. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, forthcoming). In a previous essay in this 
journal, “The Hermeneutics of Practice in DOgen and Francis of Assisi” {Eastern Bud­
dhist 14, 2, 1981, pp. 22-46), 1 argued that practice can be seen as a hermeneutical 
principle that discloses the meaning of certain texts at the same time that the texts tell 
one how to practice.
These envisioned Buddhist contributions to hermeneutical theory 
notwithstanding, there is a crucial part of our task that has been sorely 
neglected. Even if the intended relevance of texts to readers has been 
recognized by buddhologists, their own relation to the textual tradi­
tions they study is hardly ever defined. In our task to fully develop Bud­
dhist hermeneutics, we must be aware of the hermeneutical situation in 
which we stand vis-i-vis the tradition or text we wish to understand,
27
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We must do more than present Yogacarin and Svatrantikan 
hermeneutics, the hermeneutics of Tsong-kha-pa or Tsung-mi or 
Kukai; we must at the same time reflect upon and articulate how we 
come to understand their respective teachings. If we would explain the 
way that DOgen, for example, interpreted other texts, we must make ex­
plicit 1) the methods we use to interpret DOgen, and 2) the historical 
context in which we interpret Ddgen’s interpretations. Until we do so, I 
believe that our search for hermeneutics within the Buddhist tradition 
will remain limited and immature. I hope that the promise of another 
conference on Buddhist hermeneutics can be realized to explore this in- 
dispensibie dimension.
The task of defining our own own stance toward a tradition we 
would understand brings us face to face with the problem of how we 
should understand history in a Buddhist context. I will now attempt to 
describe that problem.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A BUDDHIST SENSE OF HISTORY
From Buddhist hermeneutics to Buddhist history. I have mentioned 
that, in Heidegger’s hermeneutical ontology, human understanding is 
historical in its very nature, because human beings are historical in 
their very nature. In Gadamer’s extension of this ontology, an 
awareness of our contemporary historical situation is indispensible for 
an appropriate understanding of a past tradition or text. As scholars, 
whether Western or Asian, we have come to stand in a very peculiar 
“hermeneutical situation” vis-^-vis the Buddhist tradition. This arises 
from the fact that the methods we employ to study Buddhism derive 
predominantly from the West. Modern buddhology originated in nine­
teenth century Europe, that is, in a situation that was culturally, 
ideologically, and historically remote from the Buddhist tradition it 
began to study.
The historical orientation of modern scholarship. The historico-critical 
methods developed in the West have given buddhology a strong orienta­
tion toward historical study. Historical knowledge of the development 
of Buddhism and its scriptures has been emphasized equally with 
translation of the scriptures and texts. Minoru Kiyota contrasts the 
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orientation of modern buddhology with the non-critical and ahistorical 
attitude of sectarian Buddhism scholarship. This traditional scholar­
ship
viewed systems of Buddhist thought from the perspective of a 
p’an chiao system which classified doctrines and evaluated 
them by presupposing the superiority of one’s own doctrine. 
The p’an chiao system established its own patriarchal lineage 
and honored the sayings of those patriarchs without criticism, 
without investigating the primary sources from which the 
theory and practice basic to the development of a given doc­
trine were derived. It was ahistorical in its approach to 
describing the evolution of Buddhist thought. ... An 
understanding of the history of the evolution of Buddhist 
thought, then, involves in part an investigation of [the doc­
trinal] problematics and (textual] presuppositions [operative 
at the time of composition], not simply an understanding of a 
fossilized p’an chiao system, arbitrarily assigned to enhance a 
given sectarian dogma. Modern Buddhology challenges the 
p’an chiao system and critically examines the sayings of the 
patriarchs.28
28 Minoru Kiyota, “Modern Japanese Buddhology: Its History and Problematics,” 
Journal of the international Association of Buddhist Studies 7, I (1984), pp. 21-22.
Ironically, in the light of Peter Gregory’s work on p’an chiao as a 
hermeneutical strategy, we can apply Kiyota’s criticism of traditional 
scholarship to Kiyota himself here. That is, we can say that one must 
understand the historical context, the hermeneutical situation, in 
which the p’an chiao system was developed. Gregory has shown that 
p’an chiao schemes were themselves a historical response to a par­
ticular Chinese hermeneutical problem, and has reminded us that the 
Chinese did not have access to many of the primary sources for the doc­
trines that they classified at the time. Of course, Kiyota is right in asser­
ting that later scholarship based upon such doctrinal classifications was 
uncritical. But his contention that p’an chiao was ahistorical in its ap­
proach belies a modern Western sense of history that the ninth-century 
Chinese may not have shared. Respondents at the Kuroda Institute con­
ference on Buddhist hermeneutics cited the Lotus Sutra, and Chih-i’s 
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use of it, as works very conscious of history. Chih-i’s works reflect a 
tension between timeless categories and a sense of history; between his 
unification of doctrines into a system and their place in his day, the Sui 
dynasty; and his own sense of time and need to relate Buddhism in an 
appropriate if novel way. It was suggested that scholars need to con­
sider history as a hermeneutical principle within Buddhism, to recon­
sider how Buddhists used time, temporality, and history as ways to 
organize and interpret material.29 30In order to suggest just how different 
their notions of time and history might have been, and to clarify fur­
ther the hermeneutical situation in which modern Buddhist scholarship 
stands, let me briefly summarize the relevant Western notion of 
history.
29 See especially the remarks of Carl Bielefeldt in the forthcoming volume, Buddhist 
Hermeneutics.
30 Rekishi no tetsugaku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1932), p. 1.
31 Cited in Hans Meyerhoff, The Philosophy of History in Our Time (New York: 
Doubleday, 1959), p. 13.
The sense of history governing modern scholarship. It is widely recog­
nized that “history” has two levels of meaning. Miki Kiyoshi (1897- 
1945), in his Philosophy of History, drew the traditional distinction be­
tween res gestae and historia rerum gestarum.™ I would describe the 
two levels of history as 1) story, or the narrative, temporally successive 
account of people and events, and 2) historiography, or the critical 
study of such accounts.
Ever since the researches of Herodotus and Thucydides, 
historiography has placed great importance upon discovering reasons 
for historical occurrences and evidence for the historian’s claims. The 
search for reasons often took the form of establishing causal connec­
tions between different events, or between background conditions and 
historical occurrences. The search for evidence became a prerequisite 
for historical objectivity. In the 1860’s, the father of Univer- 
salgeschichte, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), said that history (i.e., 
historiography) must seek to establish only “what really happened,” 
“things as they actually were” (wie es eigentlich gewesen [«■/]).31 If we 
ignore Ranke’s attempt to link historical epochs with God, we can say 
that he championed a new objectivity in the study of history. At the 
same time that Western scholars such as Eugene Burnouf and Friedrich 
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Max Muller began to develop modem buddhology, theologians con­
tributed much to modern historico-critical methods in their search for 
a historical Jesus behind the “Christ of faith” depicted in the 
Gospels.32 A new kind of Church history began, followed by a history 
of religions. One part of these developments was explicit reflection on 
the problem of what should count as historical writing, particularly in 
the past. In 1892, Church historian Franz Overbeck (1837-1905) 
described the characteristics considered essential for historical writing: 
there must be 1) a chronological presentation of material, and 2) an in­
tention to pass the account on to progeny. Further, in order to have 
Church history (or the history of a religious institution), the Church 
(or institution) must be seen as something that can be described 
historically, that is, as subject to history. According to Overbeck, the 
idea of writing history can only occur when a people has learned to 
distinguish one time-period from another, or more precisely, when it is 
conscious of changes undergone and of the value of recording them for 
the future.33 If modem historiography finds its roots in the classical 
Greek works, history as the story of a people finds its paradigm in the 
Old Testament writings. A pronounced historical consciousness is evi­
dent in both the Israelites’ concern with salvation in this world through 
history, and the Christian view of the crucified Christ “hurtling us 
back on our own finite history as the place in which God chose to pitch 
his tent.”34 The qualities that Overbeck sees as defining historical work 
obviously derive from the Judeo-Christian tradition.
32 A similar search for the teaching of the historical teachings of the Buddha was 
launched by European scholars and taken up by Meiji period Japanese Buddhists, 
though it was not of the same significance for Mahayana Buddhists as the Christian 
search was for Christians. See Whalen Lai, “The Search for the Historical $3kyamuni 
in Light of the Historical Jesus,” Buddhist-Christian Studies 2 (1982), pp. 77-91.
33 Uber die Anfange der Kirchengeschichtsschreibung (Basel, 1892); cited in Helwig 
Schmidt-Glintzer, Die Identitat der buddhistischen Schulen und die Compilation bud- 
dhistischer Universalgeschichten in China (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1982), p. 3.
34 I owe this phrase to Joseph S. O’Leary, from a review in Inter-Religio (Nanzan In­
stitute for Religion and Culture) 7 (Spring 1985), p. 46.
Historians today may describe the conditions necessary for historical 
writing differently, and may also rightly insist that objective historical 
writing was not the province of the modern West alone. In any case, 
however, the ideas summarized above helped to form the historical con­
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sciousness of modem buddhology, with its insistence on objectivity 
and its interest in establishing who were the historical authors, and 
what was the historical background of the various texts. The story of 
the rise of modern buddhology is made more interesting when we see 
what evidence it has discovered for Buddhist historical writing in the 
past. In the following 1 will limit myself to a few examples, rather than 
attempt an adequate review of all recent work on this topic.
The search for historical consciousness in Buddhism. Scholars gener­
ally assume that there is little, if any, historical consciousness in Indian 
religions. Heinz Bechert states that, other than accounts of a few cen­
tral events, there is no sign of an Indian Buddhist history that is to any 
extent faithful to reality. Singhalese Buddhist historical accounts from 
the second century on form a special case. Bechert regards the Tibetan 
works on Buddhist history as inspired by Chinese historical writing, 
not by Indian example.35 Of course, these assumptions do not obviate 
the need to search for a specifically Indian conception of history. Here 
I will only exemplify the search in Chinese and Japanese materials.
35 Heinz Bechert, Zum Ursprung der Geschichtsschreibung im indischen 
Kulturbereich (Gottingen, 1969), pp. 39ff., 52ff., cited in Schmidt-Glintzer, p. 2.
36 Schmidt-Glintzer, pp. 4-5. For a summary of classical Chinese notions of 
history, see the chapter “Philosophy of History’’ in Roger T. Ames, The Art of Ruler­
ship: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1983), pp. 1-27.
Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer’s book, Die Identitat der buddhistischen 
Schulen und die Kompilation buddhistischer Universalgeschichten in 
China, is a thorough examination of Sung period Buddhist universal 
(i.e., cross-sectarian, cross-dynastic) histories. A review of this rich 
study is beyond the scope of my report, but I do want to mention one 
of its conclusions that is relevant to the question at hand. (Although 
Schmidt-Glintzer does not define “history” or “historical writing,” 
the characteristics described by Overbeck would seem to hold in his 
case too.) He notes that Buddhist historical accounts in China began at 
least by the fifth century, when Buddhists wanted to show that Bud­
dhism was truly Chinese, that it had a kind of pre-existence in China. 
He concludes that Chinese Buddhist historical writing had to be mod­
elled after Confucian precedents, since history was not originally a 
Buddhist concern.36 Hence Chinese Buddhist histories originated in an 
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attempt to “naturalize” Buddhism in China. These Buddhist histories, 
to be sure, included features that distinguished them from their non­
Buddhist precedents, but the Confucian model remained decisive. 
Histories of Buddhist schools in the T’ang period paralleled earlier 
ancestral and clan histories; Sung period histories were even more sec­
tarian. The import of this conclusion is that there is nothing essentially 
Buddhist about Chinese Buddhist histories; these histories were not 
shaped by Buddhist philosophy, but rather by motives to legitimize 
Buddhism, or a particular Buddhist school, in the eyes of non-Bud- 
dhists or non-members of that school. The 1964 article by Jan Yun- 
hua, on “Buddhist Historiography in Sung China,”37 describes several 
characteristics of Sung Buddhist historical activities, but does not alter 
the import of this conclusion.
17 In Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenldndischen Gesellschaft 114 (1964), pp. 360- 
381.
38 In Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 12, 2 (1985), pp. 141-171.
39 The Future and the Past: A Translation and Study of the GukanshO (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979). See also Brown’s “Early 
Evolution of Historical Consciousness [in Japan],” forthcoming.
In my article, “Is There Historical Consciousness Within Ch’an,”38 
I attempted first to specify the notion of history that is tacitly employed 
by historians of Zen such as Yanagida Seizan and Heinrich Dumoulin, 
then to initiate the search for historical consciousness in Zen texts. My 
tentative conclusions were: 1) if we judge the texts by modern stan­
dards of fact versus fabrication, and by their awareness of historical 
conditioning versus mythical consciousness, then the Zen chronicles 
and accounts reveal little, if any, historical consciousness in the 
modern sense of the term (a few passages in Tsung-mi’s accounts of 
Zen schools would seem to be an exception); and 2) in order to deepen 
the search and to appreciate the texts better, we need to explore a 
specifically Zen, or at least Buddhist, sense of history. I will return to 
this theme in a moment, but first let me mention an exploration of 
historical consciousness in one Japanese text.
The GukanshO Btf#, written by Jien BH in 1219, is characterized 
by its translators Delmer M. Brown and Ichiro Ishida as an “inter­
pretive history.”39 It is the “first known Japanese attempt to construct 
a pattern of historical change that would explain the disturbed situa­
tion of that day and show what could be done and should be done to 
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restore peace and stability.”40 Brown and Ishida mention three 
specifically Buddhist characteristics of this secular history: its periodiza­
tion in terms of kalpic progression and decline, resulting in the present 
era of mappO its designation of four Japanese leaders as incarna­
tions of Buddha; and its views of the Buddha Law (buppO (A&) as a 
positive force that can be invoked to check kalpic decline in this 
world.41 They also remark that in its organization, the Gukansho 
differs significantly from a Confucian view of how history should be 
written.42 *Nevertheless, their conclusion is that the GukanshO is in­
spired as much by Shinto as by Buddhism; it was determined to uphold 
the divine origin and succession of the Japanese emperors, and it was 
guided by a belief in the efficacy of the gods’ blessings and in their 
power to rejuvenate the land. Of course this syncretism of mappO men­
tality and belief in regeneration does not necessarily detract from the 
historical character of the GukanshO, but its attempt to explain the con­
ditions of the times in terms of metahistorical principles (cfarz US), 
both destructive and constructive,4S does weaken the argument for the 
historical consciousness of its author.
40 Brown and Ishida, p. x.
41 Brown and Ishida, p. 10.
42 Brown and Ishida, p. 12.
41 Brown and Ishida, pp. 4-5.
The various studies described above do locate historical con­
sciousness, in a limited sense, in Chinese and Japanese Buddhist ac­
counts. But the degree of this historical consciousness is tacitly 
measured by modern standards, such as chronological order, ideals of 
factuality and objectivity, awareness of historical conditioning and of 
relevance for the future. In other words, the search for historical con­
sciousness in Buddhism is itself a reflection of modern, and mostly 
Western, historical consciousness; it is an unacknowledged symptom 
of the hermeneutical situation in which we stand vis-a-vis the texts we 
interpret. None of the studies has been able to specify a philosophically 
Buddhist sense of history, which would challenge modern historical 
sensitivity and call for a real “fusion of horizons” (Horizont- 
verschmelzung). Perhaps we do not know yet where to look for a 
specifically Buddhist notion of history, or what to look for. One ob­
vious place would seem to be in the teaching of the three ages of the
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Dharma, leading up to the age of the Final Law or mappd, that was so 
influential in medieval Japanese Buddhist thought. But today this 
teaching appears too mythical to function as an idea that touches the ac­
tual history of the world. Likewise, the idea of karma would seem to 
offer a basis for establishing causal connections in the nexus of events, 
but this idea was formed in a cyclical, “ahistorical” worldview and 
also appears too mythical for modern sensitivity, which is to say that it 
was not part of the Western myth that led to the decisive sense of 
history in modern scholarship. The ideas of the three ages and of 
karma do, however, provide a starting point for two recent 
philosophical attempts to define a Buddhist sense of history.
The philosophical search for a Buddhist notion of history. In an essay 
translated as “Centering and the World Beyond,”44 Takeuchi 
Yoshinori (b. 1913) offers an existential interpretation of the ideas of 
mappb and Buddhist eschatology. According to Takeuchi, Shinran im­
plied that the three ages of the Dharma, the three periods of 
eschatological history, are recapitulated in the life of the individual. Ac­
cordingly, we do not simply live in an age of mappO, in which direct 
awakening and self-directed practice are impossible. Rather, within 
this world of mappQ, each individual can live out the three stages of 
transformation in his or her spiritual life. In the culminating age, the 
tension between the pride remaining in our practice and our will to sur­
render is overcome, and the Name of Amida realizes itself in the world. 
In other words, in Takeuchi’s interpretation, world history becomes an 
existential dimension of the individual in his encounter with the Name 
of Amida. If we try to extrapolate a notion of history from this inter­
pretation of Shinran, we might say that in this view history realizes 
itself from within, in the present moment of encounter, rather than in a 
present set of circumstance externally conditioned by the past.
44 In Takeuchi Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism, trans. James W. Heisig. (New 
York: Crossroad, 1983), pp. 48-60.
45 Takeuchi, pp. 127-143.
Takeuchi speaks more explicitly about history in the essay, “Freeing 
and the World Beyond.”45 There he interprets Bultmann’s escha­
tology: what is central is not a historical transmission of revelation in 
the past, but a here-and-now encounter with the Gospel kerygma that 
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comes to us from the future. “With the world as its mediation, history 
can thus open up from the individual history of existential reality into 
world history. . . . The full meaning of history can only be conceived 
in terms of the meaning of religious existence as a being in the 
historical world.*’ He goes on to apply this interpretation to Bud­
dhism: “It is the same in the case of the name of Amida Buddha. I en­
counter the name of the Buddha here and now, ad-vening as eternity 
from the Pure Land.” The world symbolized by the Pure Land both is 
“discovered directly underfoot of the present” and “signifies the open­
ing up of the world in which the nembutsu is transmitted historically. . . . 
This in turn means the realization of the world in which everything mir­
rors everything else.”46 Takeuchi mentions that he has synthesized 
Bultmann and the later Heidegger here; we should also note that in one 
point at least he has reconciled Buddhism with Christianity, finding 
that, in both, truth is realized in history. I do not know whether most 
scholars of Shin Buddhism will agree with Takeuchi’s interpretations, 
but I do know that not all theologians agree with Bultmann. 
Takeuchi’s book is a profound attempt to reflect on the meaning of 
history for Buddhism and for Buddhist scholarship. In the end, 
however, it seems that he presents not a Buddhist notion of history, 
but rather an existential notion shared by some Buddhist and Christian 
thinkers.
46 Takeuchi, p. 141.
The realization of truth in history was also a conviction of 
Takeuchi’s teacher, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), who sought to for­
mulate a philosophy of history that was also a philosophy of religion. 
Tanabe was critical of Heidegger’s hermeneutical analysis of human ex­
istence as being too historicist, forgetting the absolute dimension of 
time, and too idealist, ignoring political reality.
Hermeneutics is always accompanied by historicism. But 
history cannot get free of the relativism involved in 
“historicism” if it is deprived of the unity of transcendent 
nothingness in the “eternal now.” . . . [Heidegger’s] 
hermeneutics . . . has not escaped idealistic subjectivism. . . . 
From such an abstract standpoint, it is impossible to under­
stand the political vicissitudes of societies or states, which 
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make up the content of history. This limitation is understan­
dable, given the fact that hermeneutics has developed from a 
method of interpreting the history of culture [and not the 
history of politics].
The historical world must rather be conceived in terms of a circular 
movement toward the absolute in ethics and back to the world in 
religion.47
47 Cited from chapter three, “Absolute Critique and Historicity,” of Philosophy as 
Metanoetics, trans. Y. Takeuchi, V. Viglieimo, and J. Heisig (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, forthcoming). This is not the place to assess 
critically Tanabe’s philosophy of history; indeed the treatment of history by all the 
Kyoto school philosophers I mention, and by Nishida as well, deserves a much fuller ac­
count than can be given here.
4S “Ordinary Mind,” trans. Tokiwa Gishin and Howard Curtis, in the Eastern Bud­
dhist 12, 1 (May 1979), pp. 24, 28.
Takeuchi and Tanabe, in their common concern to relate Pure Land 
Buddhist philosophy to a modern, secularized world, have recourse to 
the here-and-now realization of truth. In this respect they would seem 
to be in accord with Zen views. On closer examination, however, their 
views contrast with those of Zen-oriented philosophers. Zen has 
tended not to separate so clearly the secular and the sacred, or this 
world and a beyond, and so has not felt the same need to reconcile 
history and religious truth. Hisamatsu Shin’ichi (1889-1980) goes so 
far as to say: “That man has religion is proof that he is not satisfied 
with the view that history is everything, or that it is central.” He speaks 
of the emergence of the true self or “fundamental subject” that “is not 
achieved in the movement of history, that is, through the historical 
dialectic. It is accomplished at the root-source of history, which is prior 
to the birth of history.”48 This is the source of Hisamatsu’s famous 
“supra-historical history,” “history that transcends history.”
Takeuchi’s tendency to existentialize history, and his discovery of 
truth “directly underfoot of the present,” would also seem to reflect 
the views of another Kyoto School philosopher, Nishitani Keiji (b. 
1900); but again the emphasis has shifted. Instead of a realization of 
truth in history, we find the realization of history in the infinity of the 
moment. Nishitani*s reflections on historicity and historical con­
sciousness occur in the two final chapters of his book, Religion and 
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Nothingness.49 These reflections can help us determine the extent to 
which modern historiography is part of a heritage alien to Buddhism 
and perhaps prejudicial to Buddhist notions of history. In Nishitani’s 
work, the myth of karma that might have given rise to a Buddhist no­
tion of history is demythologized and given an existential interpreta­
tion. More germane to our consideration here, however, is the direc­
tion in which Nishitani develops the notion of historical consciousness.
49 Nishitani Keiji, ShQkyO to wa nanika (Tokyo, 1961); translated with an introduc­
tion by Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1932).
50 Nishitani, p. 206.
51 Nishitani, p. 203.
52 Nishitani, p. 209.
53 Nishitani, p. 211.
“The claim that historical consciousness originated with the Jewish 
people contains serious problems,” he writes.50 But the problems he 
points out are of a religious, not historical nature. That is, he does not 
concern himself with historical counterclaims that the ancient Greeks, 
or the Chinese long before them, were historically conscious. Rather 
he suggests that the ancient Israelites’ consciousness of being a chosen 
people with a divine career entailed a deeply rooted self-centeredness.51 
Historical consciousness here seems to mean an awareness of retaining 
through time a privileged identity as a group, though this sense would 
certainly fit groups other than the Israelites. For Christianity, Nishitani 
continues, not only does history have a beginning and a divine plan but 
also an end determined by the transhistorical will of God. Redemption 
and the last judgment occur as irrevocable historical events within 
linear time. The consciousness of history that arises from this 
awareness of original sin, freedom, and the once-and-for-all nature 
(Einmaligkeit) of time, is one of self-centered consciousness. Later 
European Enlightenment retained the view that history has a meaning, 
but one given by the intellect of man, not by the will of God. It re­
placed eschatology with a belief in historical progress.52 53The aim of 
history was immanent in history: the rationalization of human life. 
Although both the Christian and the Enlightenment views were under­
mined by Nietzsche, they made a lasting contribution to the Western 
heritage in what Nishitani calls historicity in its twofold sense: 
historical consciousness, and history become conscious.55 (Both of 
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these senses harbor the aforementioned problem of self-centeredness.) 
“History become conscious” presumably refers to the Enlightenment 
ideal, whereas “historical consciousness” would here again refer to the 
notion of a divine plan. Both allow for something absolutely new being 
created in time, or for “historicity” in Nishitani’s preferred sense of 
the term.54 But modern historical consciousness began precisely with 
the denial of a beginning and end to history and with the commitment 
to reason. This immanent view, which developed into history as a 
social science, is as much a part of the modern Christian’s view of 
history as is the contrary notion of transhistorical meaning.
54 Nishitani, p. 212.
55 As Winston King suggested to me, one might better call the Judeo-Christian no­
tion of time and history “homo-centric”; from a Christian perspective, the Zen view 
might appear extremely self-centric, collapsing past and future to the present moment.
56 Historian Leonard Marsak notes that the Enlightenment “sense of historical time 
. . . saw history as a continuum of moments objectively equal in time, in which each 
moment may be subjectively heightened by the sum of lived experience, personal and 
historical. The millenarian conceives the moment otherwise; as the sum of all time con­
tained in one lived experience” (The Enlightenment, New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1972, p. 7).
What is germane to our topic here is not Nishitani’s critique of the 
Christian view or of self-centeredness,55 but the connection he sees be­
tween modern historiography and the Western heritage of Judeo-Chris- 
tianity and the Enlightenment. Extrapolating from Nishitani’s ac­
count, it would seem that modern historiography, as practiced by 
many buddhologists for example, carries on certain features of the the 
Western heritage but leaves behind other elements. It suspends judg­
ment on the question of the meaning or progress of history, but con­
tinues to assume linear time and the once-and-for-all character of ac­
tual events. Likewise, it brackets the question of a beginning or end to 
history, but assumes the Enlightenment notion of an objective equality 
of succeeding moments.56
Nishitani seeks a sense of history that recognizes the once-and-for-all 
character of time and the possibility of truly novel occurrences, and 
that in this respect is consonant with the viewpoint of modern 
historiography. But, at the same time, he seeks a sense of history that 
realizes the absoluteness and incomparability of each moment, and 
therefore preserves the religious character of history.57 The full 
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historicity of history is not captured by a sense of history 1) as ter­
minated by the intrusion of the transhistorical at the end of time (the 
Christian view); 2) as progressing toward the consummate rationaliza­
tion of human life (the view of the European Enlightenment); 3) as 
groundless and of unbounded meaninglessness (nihilism); nor 4) as 
repeated endlessly on the transhistorical ground of ‘‘eternal recur­
rence” (Nietzsche). Rather, history becomes radically historical when 
its historicity is carried through to a transhistorical ground. But how is 
this possible? Historicity is able to realize itself radically only on the 
standpoint of fOnyata, the standpoint of the bottomlessness of the mo­
ment.57 8 Each individual moment of unending time possesses the very 
same solemnity that is thought in Christianity to be possessed by the 
special moments of the creation, fall, redemption, and second com­
ing.59 “In bottomlessly embracing the endless past and endless future, 
we bring time to fullness of time at each and every moment of time.”60 
Each point of historical time pierces through the field of emptiness, 
sdnyatd.
57 Nishitani, pp. 207-208.
58 Nishitani, pp. 211-217.
59 Nishitani, p. 272.
60 Nishitani, p. 181.
61 In Zen Buddhism Today: Annual Report of the Kyoto Zen Symposium 1 (1983), 
pp. 56-70.
Nishitani’s reflections give rise to a uniquely Buddhist (or at least 
Zen) sense of history. Based upon the Buddhist notion of siinyatG, this 
view points to the concentration of time in the present moment, and, at 
the same time, to the infinite openness beneath each present moment, 
freeing it to be uniquely itself—but realized only when the actor in 
history loses his self-centeredness. As profound as these reflections are, 
however, it is difficult to apply them to the sense of history operative in 
modern historiography and buddhology, and thus it is difficult to sur­
mise how they might revolutionize historical methods in the study of 
Buddhism. Nishitani himself pointed out to me that his reflections were 
meant to explicate a notion of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), not a no­
tion of history as practiced by historians.
I will summarize one other philosophically oriented attempt to 
specify a Buddhist sense of history. Aramaki Noritoshi, in an essay on 
“History and Buddhism in Creative Ages,”61 outlines a general theory 
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of history and illustrates the theory with two examples. He suggests 
that historical periods can be defined as community-based, as in­
dividual-based, or as formed by the complex interaction of these two: 
the existential-communal and the individual-intersubjective social struc­
tures. Buddhism is a religion of the last category. To exemplify his 
thesis, Aramaki translates a passage, thought to be the Buddha's 
words, from the Attandandasutta (Suttanipata 935-954) and then a 
passage from Zen master Hui-ssu ££ (515-577), both expressing a 
deep consciousness of samsara and, in the case of Hui-ssu, also of 
mappO. In conclusion, Aramaki states that “creative thinkers such as 
the Buddha and Hui-ssu experienced their historical and social situa­
tions as nihilistic samsara, and were thus conditioned by history; and . . . 
[yet] transformed their historical and social situations into a cultural 
nirvana, and are thus conditioning history.”62 Although I do not grasp 
what “cultural nirvana" means here, I think that Aramaki is sug­
gesting that samsara and nirvana are not only notions that arose at a 
certain time in history, and not only reflected the historical conditions 
of the time, but actually transformed those conditions. If my 
understanding is correct, then Aramaki’s suggestions would provide a 
starting point for a peculiarly Buddhist notion of history.
62 Aramaki, p. 70.
As will be evident to any scholar of Buddhism, it is difficult indeed to 
apply any of these philosophical discussions to the search for Buddhist 
notions of history in the past, much less to actually practiced 
historiographical methods. But to say how far apart this discussion 
and current practices are, is to say how far we still are from specifying 
Buddhist notions of history. It should not be forgotten that modern 
buddhological investigative technique often derived from sophisticated 
philosophical discussions, but discussions informed by Western, not 
Buddhist, philosophy.
Conclusion: an appeal for Further Investigation
I concluded section two of this report by saying that the current 
search for Buddhist hermeneutics is impeded by a lack of self-reflec­
tion; we need to reflect upon our own “hermeneutical strategies” and 
our own “hermeneutical situation” vis-^-vis the tradition, if we are to 
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do justice to the figures and texts that we investigate. (Of course, it may 
be said that my emphasis on our present “hermeneutical situation'* 
and on self-reflection is itself a bias of modern Western hermeneutics, 
and not necessarily a feature of Buddhist hermeneutics; but I believe 
that this self-investigation is essential to Buddhist teachings as well.) 
The hermeneutics we investigate is often remote from the hermeneutics 
we ourselves practice. For example, we no longer apply p’an chiao 
schemes to our own (historical) classifications of Buddhist scriptures. 
And although we may employ expedient means in teaching one 
another, and may call some texts more difficult than others, as objec­
tive buddhologists we do not ordinarily interpret some teachings as in­
ferior and others as superior; upaya is not one of our hermeneutical 
strategies. Further, there are probably no texts that for us are not in 
need of interpretation, that are nTttirtha as opposed to neyQrtha. In our 
present historical, hermeneutical situation, we usually do not ap­
propriate the various Buddhist hermeneutics that we discover; what 
then is their significance for us?
Concomitantly, we may ask why we study history in the first place. 
Among the many reasons that have been offered are: 1) To learn the 
truth about the past—an objective, factual truth. Ranke said, “History 
cannot judge the past, or instruct the present for the benefit of future 
ages; it wants only to show what actually happened.” 2) To guide us in­
to a better future. Santayana said that those who are ignorant of 
history are bound to repeat its mistakes. 3) To enlighten us about our 
present conditions. The critical study of history exercises the enlighten­
ing function of reason, Habermas claims. Whether oriented toward 
past, future, or present, however, these statements presuppose notions 
of actuality that may not be shared by ancient Buddhist writers. If Bud­
dhist hermeneutics is liberating in the sense of divesting one of illusions 
and serving as a critique of ideologies, then one would expect it also to 
be critical of the notions of actuality that are taken for granted in the 
current methods of historians.
Minoru Kiyota also reflects upon the function of historical study in 
the article I referred to before. Describing the tasks of modern bud­
dhology, he calls for more translations of texts (a supremely 
hermeneutical task), and he upholds the modern emphasis on the im­
portance of historical knowledge, especially of “the socio-cultural 
basis that led to the origin and subsequent development of Buddhism. . . .
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[The modem] “historical approach to Buddhism no longer allows the 
mythologization of the historical Buddha and of Buddhist India, and 
the concomitant dogmatization of Buddhist thought.**63 On the other 
hand, he writes that it is inadequate to identify Buddhism only within 
the limits of a nineteenth-century European rational philosophy.
63 Kiyota, p. 29.
M Kiyota, p. 31.
The pitfail of modern Buddhology—with its emphasis on 
sheer objectivity—lies in ignoring the hopes and aspirations 
which the Buddhists throughout their history have derived 
from the Buddha-Dharma, as they themselves have conceived 
it. . . . The intent of the historical Buddha was not by any 
means to ignore the historicity of mankind, but to provide the 
wisdom to cope with the everlasting crisis to which man is 
subject, and to contribute creatively to world civilization.64
What Kiyota intimates, then, is that we study Buddhist history to ac­
tualize Buddhist prajnQ.
I feel that we need to pursue the study of Buddhist history in a way 
that is not rationalistic, not apologetical, not sectarian, but also not 
timorous; we should not hesitate to articulate Buddhist notions of 
history and their relevance for modern buddhology. Buddhologists 
have often been critical of the lack of objectivity in traditional Bud­
dhist histories and chronicles that were composed, in part, to legitimize 
Buddhism, or a particular Buddhist sect, in the eyes of others. At the 
same time, many today pursue objectivity in their studies in order to 
legitimize Buddhism, and particularly Buddhist studies, in the 
academic world. In the world of modern buddhology, reflection upon 
methodology is commonplace; but reflection upon what history might 
have meant for the figures and texts of the past, and upon what it 
means to us today, is rare. This lack of reflection accompanies that in 
the search for Buddhist hermeneutics, where scholars have thought 
about what interpretation meant for various figures and texts, but have 
not reflected sufficiently upon their own interpretive stance. I hope that 
more attention will be given to these problems in the future.
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